Transactional Lock Elision (TLE) uses Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) to execute unmodified critical sections concurrently, even if they are protected by the same lock. To ensure correctness, the transactions used to execute these critical sections "subscribe" to the lock by reading it and checking that it is available. A recent paper proposed using the tempting "lazy subscription" optimization for a similar technique in a different context, namely transactional systems that use a single global lock (SGL) to protect all transactional data.
Introduction
Hardware Transactional Memory [4, 15, 22] provides hardware support for atomically executing a section of code, without requiring programmers to determine how this atomicity is achieved. Numerous techniques for exploiting HTM to improve the performance and scalability of concurrent programs have been described in the literature [8, 10, 11, 14, 20] .
The simplest and most readily exploitable of these techniques is Transactional Lock Elision (TLE) [8, 20] , which targets existing lock-based applications without requiring them to be restructured and without modifying critical section code. TLE uses a hardware transaction to atomically apply the effects of a critical section without acquiring the lock, thereby allowing other critical sections protected by the same lock to be similarly executed in parallel, provided their data accesses do not conflict. * Copyright c 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Because hardware transactions may fail due to conflicts or to limitations of the HTM implementation, some critical sections must still be executed in the traditional manner (i.e., not in a hardware transaction) after acquiring the lock. To ensure that a critical section executed in a hardware transaction does not observe partial effects of a critical section executed by another thread that acquires the lock, the transaction "subscribes" to the lock, i.e., it reads the lock and confirms that it is available. Similar techniques can be used to implement a transactional memory system in which all transactional data is protected by a single global lock (SGL), and transactions are executed either by acquiring the lock, or within a hardware transaction that subscribes to the lock.
Subscribing to the lock makes hardware transactions vulnerable to abort if another thread acquires the lock. Typically, transactions subscribe to the lock at the beginning of the critical section and are thus vulnerable to such abort during the entire execution of the critical section. It is therefore tempting to use a lazy subscription optimization [7] , which delays lock subscription, in order to reduce the duration of this vulnerability. Calciu et al. [3] recently proposed to use this technique for SGL-based transactional systems.
A simple (but incorrect) way to implement lazy subscription for TLE is to delay subscription until immediately before committing the transaction. This way the implementation affects only library code and does not require analysis or modification of critical section code, retaining the key advantage of TLE that makes it the most promising way to exploit HTM in the near future.
One might reason that this "lazy subscription" technique is safe for TLE on the grounds that the hardware transaction ensures that all of the memory accesses performed by the critical section, together with the check that the lock is not held, are performed atomically, and therefore the effects of committing the transaction are identical from the perspective of other threads. Unfortunately, as we show, there are subtle problems with this reasoning. In fact, TLE with lazy subscription is subject to a number of pitfalls that can violate correctness by changing the application's semantics.
Because SGL-based transaction systems generally entail static analysis of all code potentially executed within transactions, there is an opportunity for the compiler to recognize situations in which transactions will potentially behave incorrectly, and to ensure they subscribe to the lock before allowing this possibility. However, the analysis proposed by Calciu et al. [3] is not sufficient to avoid all of the pitfalls we identify. Furthermore, we argue that it is unlikely to be practical to enhance the static analysis to make lazy subscription safe while retaining its benefits because subscription will be required relatively early in all but very simple cases.
< release lock L > 17 } Figure 1 : Pseudocode showing basic TLE (left) and lazy subscription version (right). The txbegin instruction specifies a label to which control branches if the transaction aborts for any reason. The use TLE method represents a policy decision about whether to use TLE; using TLE returns the value most recently received by the thread from use TLE. These methods take an argument identifying the lock to enable support for general locking patterns; this is not needed if locking is assumed to be properly nested.
Hardware extensions are briefly described in [3] that the authors claim would allow these issues to be avoided entirely. However, their extensions are not sufficient to avoid all of the pitfalls we describe. In this paper, we describe ways in which HTM implementations could be enhanced to make lazy subscription safe for both TLE and SGL-based transaction implementations, without special compiler analysis. We also explain how the technique can be even more effective if the extended HTM implementation supports nontransactional loads.
While we believe that the hardware enhancements we describe are practical and implementable, they will entail nontrivial cost and complexity. In ongoing work, we are exploring the value of the lazy subscription optimization to help assess whether such hardware extensions are likely to be justified; preliminary results suggest that it provides significant performance benefit in at least some cases. Collectively, our work in this area contributes to understanding of the problem and potential solutions, and to consideration of whether the benefits of such optimizations justify the cost and complexity required by hardware extensions to make them safe.
TLE and lazy subscription
TLE is typically implemented by modifying lock library code so that the lock acquire method begins a transaction, checks that the lock is available, and if so allows the critical section to execute without acquiring the lock. This lock "subscription" adds the lock to the transaction's read set, so that the transaction will abort if the lock is subsequently acquired before it commits. If the lock is not available, the transaction is aborted and the critical section execution attempt is retried, either in another hardware transaction or by acquiring the lock and executing the critical section as usual. The lock release method commits the transaction if the critical section was executed in a transaction and releases the lock otherwise.
This arrangement is illustrated in pseudocode on the left side of Figure 1 , where use TLE and using TLE abstract away practical details such as whether and how long to back off before retrying, whether to wait for the lock to be available before retrying, how many attempts to make using HTM before giving up and acquiring the lock, supporting nesting, and how the release method determines whether the acquire method chose to use TLE. These issues are not relevant to correctness, which is our focus here; some of them are explored in detail in [9] .
A TLE transaction executed using the simple technique illustrated on the left of Figure 1 has the lock in its read set throughout the execution of the critical section. Thus, any critical section that acquires the lock in this entire duration will cause the transaction to abort. One might consider it an advantage to abort such transactions earlier, given that they may waste less work in this case. However, this reasoning overlooks the fact that in many cases the abort is not necessary (for example because the critical sections executing in the transaction and with the lock held do not conflict), so avoiding it is preferable.
Simple lazy subscription, illustrated on the right side of Figure 1 , moves subscription from the acquire method to the release method, allowing the transaction to execute the entire (unmodified) critical section without subscribing, with the understanding that it would do so before committing.
Unfortunately, if a critical section executed in a transaction observes values in memory that it could not observe if all critical sections were executed while holding the lock, then it may behave differently than is intended by the programmer who wrote the critical section code.
One might argue that this is not a problem, as follows: The transaction will try to commit only after subscribing to the lock and observing that the lock is available, implying that its read set has a consistent view of memory. Therefore, if the transaction saw an inconsistent view of memory, then the normal HTM mechanisms will cause it to abort. This is the essence of the "intuititive" correctness argument in [3] . But this incorrectly assumes that the transaction will eventually execute the correct subscription code and observe the correct lock state before attempting to commit. If this is not the case, then the transaction may erroneously commit, with unpredictable effects. We discuss a number of ways in which the transaction may fail to correctly subscribe to the lock in the next section.
Pitfalls of lazy subscription
Lazy subscription can cause a transaction to deviate from behavior allowed by the original program in a variety of ways. Some of these behaviors are benign, because the transaction aborts and therefore its effects are not observed by other threads. In particular, most HTM implementations ensure that, if a transaction executes code-such as divide-by-zero-that would ordinarily cause the program to crash, it simply aborts. However, below we explain a number of ways in which a transactions that deviate from the original program's behavior can commit successfully, resulting in observably incorrect behavior.
Observing inconsistent state If a thread executes a critical section without acquiring or subscribing to the lock, this can result in the thread's registers containing values that could never occur in an execution of the original program. This is illustrated by the example in Figure 2 , in which a shared variable next method indicates the method to perform next time apply next is invoked. If the critical section is executed in a transaction with lazy subscription, at line 9 it may observe the value of next method as 2 because another thread that is executing the critical section while holding the lock is just about to reset next method to zero (at line 11). The use of the lock in the original program ensures that no thread ever reads 2 from next method.
Below we describe a number of ways in which such inconsistent state can lead to observably incorrect behavior. Indirect branch Continuing the example above, after a transaction reads 2 from next method, it reads the value stored immediately after the method table array and treats it as a function pointer, invoking the "code" at that address. Because this address may point to any code or data, the result of executing code stored at the address is unpredictable. In particular, it might commit the transaction, without ever subscribing to the lock.
This example shows that a thread executing a critical section in a transaction that has not yet subscribed to the lock can observe values in memory that it could never observe in any execution of the original program and that it can commit nonetheless, resulting in observably incorrect behavior. While this is sufficient to conclude that lazy subscription cannot be blindly used for TLE with unmodified critical section code, it is important to understand that there are many other ways in which reading inconsistent values from memory can indirectly result in incorrect behavior, as described below.
Propagating inconsistent state Once a thread's registers are in a state not allowed in the original program, this inconsistency can propagate through the thread's state in numerous ways, resulting in differences from behavior that could be observed in an execution of the original program:
• Inconsistent values may propagate between registers via arithmetic operations, register moves, etc.
• Inconsistent values in registers may propagate to memory written by the transaction explicitly or implicitly (e.g., arguments to method calls, register spills).
• Inconsistent register values may be used as addresses for stores to memory, resulting in locations being written that would not be written by the transaction in an execution of the original program.
• Inconsistent values written to memory or to inconsistent locations may propagate back to registers via loads, either explicitly or implicitly.
• Conditional control flow may differ.
These effects are benign if the transaction aborts, but they can lead to the transaction committing without subscribing to the lock in a number of ways, some of which are discussed below.
Conditional code that commits the transaction If a condition in a transaction executing before subscribing to the lock evaluates differently because of an inconsistent value in a register, then a code path may be executed that would not be executed by the original program. Because we assume arbitrary, unmodified critical section code, we cannot rule out the possibility that this code could commit the transaction without subscribing to the lock.
Lock scribbling A memory write that uses an inconsistent register for its target address may overwrite the lock protecting the critical section with a value that makes it appear to be available. In this scenario, even if the correct lock subscription code is executed and subscribes to the correct lock, it may incorrectly conclude that the lock is available and commit the transaction.
Subscribing to the wrong "lock" If the address of the lock protecting the critical section is stored in a register or memory location that is inconsistent, then even if the correct subscription code is executed, the transaction may incorrectly conclude that the lock is available and commit.
Self modifying code Similar to lock scribbling, if a transaction that has observed inconsistent state writes incorrect values to memory, or writes to an incorrect address, the transaction could execute code that it has itself incorrectly written. Again, this could result in committing the transaction without subscribing to the lock.
Corrupted return address Finally, we present one more concrete example showing how an inconsistent value read from memory can propagate to cause the transaction to commit without subscribing to the lock. In this example, similar to the indirect branch example above, a transaction using late subscription reads a value from memory that it could never read in the original program. This time, it uses this value as an index into a stack-allocated array and writes to memory at the indexed location. In this case, if the inconsistent value is not a valid index into the array, the target location may happen to be the stack location containing the function's return address, and the value written may happen to be the address of the instruction that commits the transaction. When the function returns, it will execute the instruction to commit the transaction without attempting to subscribe to the lock.
Avoiding the pitfalls via compiler support
TLE is the most promising way to exploit HTM in the short term because it can be applied to unmodified critical sections, with no special compiler support. (Note that modifying critical sections may be required in order to achieve the best performance, but not to ensure correctness.) As explained above, lazy subscription cannot be applied to TLE without sacrificing this important property.
For the context of SGL-based transactional systems, compiler support for analyzing code to be executed in transactions is typically required anyway, so there is an opportunity for the compiler to analyze and modify such code in order to make lazy subscription safe. Indeed, Calciu et al. [3] proposed that the compiler ensure that transactions subscribe to the lock before executing an indirect branch in order to avoid the indirect branch pitfall described above. (We note, however, that they suggested this only for the case in which the transaction had already written to memory; the indirect branch example above shows that this is not sufficient, as it does not write to memory before executing the indirect branch.)
Presumably they also assumed that the compiler would conservatively disallow the use of instructions that would commit the transaction within any code that could potentially be executed within a transaction. This would avoid the "conditional code that commits the transaction" pitfall.
However, Calciu et al. did not identify the remaining pitfalls described above, nor did they propose any mechanisms that would avoid them. Given the diverse range of ways in which a transaction may commit incorrectly, we would argue that any static analysis that is sufficient to ensure correctness would entail significantly more complexity than is suggested in [3] .
The complexity required by such static analysis may be mitigated to some degree by conservatively subscribing to the lock to avoid the need to precisely determine whether the transaction may violate correctness in various cases. However, this reduces the effectiveness of the lazy subscription optimization.
Given the numerous ways in which inconsistency can propagate and manifest, even maximally precise analysis will likely often require relatively early subscription. For example, the corrupted return address pitfall suggests that subscription is necessary before the first time a transaction returns from a function call after reading a potentially-inconsistent value from memory and subsequently performing a write, even to its own stack. Applying this rule precisely requires analysis that ensures any record of whether the transaction has previously read from memory is accurate.
Similarly, avoiding the "subscribing to the wrong lock" pitfall requires the transaction to ensure that its notion of which lock it is eliding is not corrupted by propagating inconsistent data. Avoiding "lock scribbling" requires not only a reliable record of the lock's address, but also knowledge of the structure of the lock, unless the compiler is so conservative that it does not allow any writes to memory based on a potentially-inconsistent address register.
Clearly at least some safe deferral of lock subscription is possible with sufficiently precise or conservative analysis. However, we believe the complexity required to make lazy subscription safe using software techniques alone is unlikely to be worthwhile for the degree to which subscription can be deferred in practice.
Finally, we note that hardware extensions briefly described in [3] are not sufficient to avoid all of the pitfalls described above. In particular, although the proposed extensions ensure that the correct lock is subscribed to before a transaction commits, there is no mechanism proposed to avoid the "lock scribbling" pitfall.
Making lazy subscription safe and effective
The essence of all of the hardware approaches we describe for supporting lazy subscription is to ensure that the lock and the method for subscribing to it are identified before beginning transactional execution of a critical section, and to ensure that the transaction correctly subscribes to the identified lock using the identified method before committing, regardless of what code the transaction executes. (For generality, we note that in fact this and other information discussed below only needs to be recorded before any actions that could potentially corrupt the information being recorded. However, because recording this information does not make the transaction more vulnerable to abort, it is unlikely to be worthwhile to complicate an implementation in order to delay this reording.) We begin with a simple approach and then present more complex approaches that address its limitations.
A simple but inflexible approach
First, it is preferable that transactions are limited to execute only for a bounded number of instructions or cycles. This avoids the possibility that a critical section that is executed with lazy subscription goes into an infinite loop due to observing transient data. Without this restriction, another solution would be needed to avoid this possibility, such as requiring transactions to subscribe to a special variable that is periodically modified. Most or all existing HTM implementations already limit transaction length.
In our simple approach, we next add a special register, called the lock address register (LAR), which is set to the address of the lock before beginning transactional execution of a critical section. Any attempt to modify the contents of the LAR during transactional execution causes the transaction to abort. Any attempt to commit an outermost hardware transaction (i.e., one that is not nested within another hardware transaction) causes the location identified by the LAR to be read transactionally and compared to zero; if the comparison fails, then the transaction is aborted. Furthermore, any attempt by the thread executing the transaction to write to the memory location whose address is stored in the LAR causes the transaction to abort. This approach is simple to implement, but suffers from several severe limitations.
Limitations of the simple approach
The simple approach desribed above supports only locks that represent the "available" state by storing zero at the address used to identify the lock. Some other locks could be supported by the addition of another register that is similarly set before the transaction and not modifiable during it, which would store a bitmask to use to check lock availability; for example, this would support seqlocks [5, 16] , which use only a single bit to represent lock availability, while storing additional information in other bits (the sequence number in the case of seqlocks).
Nonetheless, many other important lock types are not supported so easily. For example, ticket locks [13, 19] require two values to be compared to test lock availability, local-spin locks such as CLH [6, 17] require a pointer to be dereferenced and the pointed-to value tested for availability, etc.
Although a conservative approximation of lock availability suffices to preserve correctness, it may reduce or eliminate the benefit of TLE. For example, some lock types [1, 2] represent the "available" state as zero until the lock experiences contention, at which point it is "inflated", requiring a pointer to be dereferenced to accurately determine lock availability. Simple schemes like the one described above would thereafter always determine that the lock is not available, thus permanently eliminating the benefit of TLE.
In principle, arbitrarily complex subscription methods could be baked into hardware, so that they could not be modified by critical section code that has observed transient data. However, it is clearly preferable to be able to express subscription methods in software, as discussed further below.
The simple approach is also limited in that it does not fully support lazy subscription for nested critical sections: if the LAR has already been set to ensure lazy subscription of the lock for one critical section, then it would not be possible to achieve lazy subscription of a nested critical section protected by a different lock. It is not difficult to extend the ideas described above to support a fixed number of nesting levels by allowing multiple LARs and, if applicable, associated bitmasks and/or subscription methods. Alternatively, protected memory area(s)-specified by base and size registers that are protected as described abovecould allow a set of addresses and associated bitmasks and/or subscription methods to be stored; any attempt to reduce the size of the protected memory area, or to modify locations in it or locations identified by it would cause transaction abort.
We note that it is possible that, due to observing transient data, a nested critical section may be configured to use the wrong lock subscription method or the wrong lock. This is not a problem, however, because this can happen only as a result of observing transient data protected by the lock associated with an enclosing critical section. This implies that at least one enclosing critical section was correctly configured to subscribe to the correct lock before the transient data was observed. The nested transaction is allowed to commit only if all of the nested critical sections successfully subscribe to their locks before committing, and this is guaranteed not to be the case for the (at least one) lock that is correctly subscribed.
More flexible approaches
To support arbitrary lock types, we add anther register, which is managed and protected against corruption similarly to the LAR discussed above; this subscription code address register (SCAR) identifies the code for subscribing to the lock identified by the LAR. (If nesting of different lock types that require different subscription code is desired, similar techniques as described above for managing nested locks can be used to record their addresses.)
To ensure correct subscription, we must ensure that the critical section cannot overwrite the subscription code and that it cannot modify data that the subscription code reads; the latter is necessary to avoid the lock scribbling pitfall. On the surface, this seems challenging because the hardware cannot predict which code will be executed when the function identifued by the SCAR is invoked, nor what data it will access.
An important insight into these issues is that it is not necessary to abort a transaction as soon as it writes to the lock contents or the subscription code. We must ensure only that it does not commit successfully without correctly subscribing to the lock. Thus, attempts to overwrite lock data or subscription code need not be detected until the subscription method attempts to execute the modified code or to read the modified lock data.
Therefore, a central aspect of our approach to supporting flexible, software-defined lock subscription is to enter a mode immediately before starting to execute the subscription code in which, if the transaction attempts to execute code or to read data that is in the transaction's write set, the transaction aborts and does not take effect. Because HTM implementations must generally detect cases in which a transaction reads data it has written, supporting this behavior does not add significant additional complexity to an HTM design.
As a side note, while transactions could conceivably be used to simplify techniques based on self-modifying code by ensuring sets of changes take effect atomically, we believe that the benefits (if any) of being able to modify and execute code within the same transaction are outweighed by the likelihood of such questionable practices resulting in incorrect behavior. Therefore, it may make sense to prevent transactions from executing code they have modified, independent of the lazy subscription technique. In contrast, aborting a transaction because it reads data that it has written clearly does not make sense in general, so this behavior should be limited to the execution of lazy subscription code.
We note a potential disadvantage, namely that a transaction might be caused to abort unnecessarily if it modifies data that is near the lock, but not actually part of the lock. This could happen, for example, if the lock is co-located with data it protects, for example in the same cache line (if this is the granularity at which a transaction's write set is tracked).
This does not compromise correctness; it is only a performance issue, albeit a potentially significant one. The issue could be mitigated, at the expense of additional hardware cost and complexity, by maintaining state for each cache line modified by a transaction that records at finer granularity-per word, for example-which parts of the cache line have been modified by the transaction. Doing so would allow the subscription method to avoid aborting a transaction that has modified data in the same cache line as some data read by the subscription method, even though it has not modified any data actually read by the subscription method.
A similar approach was suggested by Tabba et al. [21] for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary transaction aborts due to false sharing.
Further extensions
The purpose of the lazy subscription technique is to reduce the window in which a transactionally-executed critical section is vulnerable to abort due to the lock being held or acquired. We observe that, if a transaction determines that the lock is held when it performs this subscription, it is immediately doomed to abort and retry. This could be mitigated by techniques that allow a transaction to wait for a variable to change value, without aborting.
For example, if the HTM supports nontransactional loads, then in some cases it is possible to use them to wait for the lock to become available before subscribing to the lock. Such waiting does not compromise the correctness of the subscription, because the lock would ultimately be subscribed to transactionally before committing the transaction. As a simple example, if the lock is a single word representing "available" and "locked" states, the subscription method would repeatedly read the word using nontransactional loads until the lock state is "available", and would then load the lock word transactionally, and confirm that it is available before committing the transaction.
The effectiveness of such approaches of course depends on the availability of hardware features on the relevant platform to support waiting until a variable's value changes without aborting a transaction. We recommend that designers of future HTM features consider whether their design would effectively support such techniques.
Independent of the lazy subscription technique, our discussions of the use of nontransactional memory operations within hardware transactions raise an important observation. If an HTM feature supports nontransactional stores (or any kind of side effect that may affect program semantics when executed in a transaction that aborts), then care must be taken not to use such instructions within critical sections to be used with TLE. The reason is that, if an attempt to execute such a critical section in a hardware transaction via TLE fails, then the store may take effect even though the critical section has not been executed yet. This could result in program behavior that would not be possible if critical sections were always executed while holding the lock, breaking the TLE technique.
While it may seem that such nontransactional store instructions would generally be used only in code that is intended to be explicitly used in transactions, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that some code intended for use in hardware transactions might also be called in critical sections protected by a lock, in which case using TLE to elide such critical sections would change program semantics.
This observation may motivate support for a transaction execution mode that insists that all store instructions-even nontransactional ones-are executed transactionally; this mode would be used for TLE. In the absence of such protection, any nontransactional store feature needs to be used with care to ensure this scenario does not occur.
Concluding remarks
We have discussed a number of ways in which the "lazy subscription" optimization for Transactional Lock Elision (TLE)-in which lock subscription is delayed until the end of transactional critical section execution in order to reduce the transaction's window of vulnerability to abort-is not safe in general with existing hardware transactional memory (HTM) features. A transaction may observe inconsistent data if it does not subscribe to the lock early, and as a result may fail to correctly subscribe to the lock before committing.
Dalessandro et al. [7] first proposed lazy subscription and pointed out that a hardware transaction must ensure its reads are consistent before executing any instructions that may be dangerous if executed based on inconsistent reads. The Reduced NOrec algorithm of Matveev and Shavit [18] recognizes the same issue, and explicitly separates out cases that are not compatible with lazy subscription in order to allow lazy subscription for the other (hopefully common) cases. Specifically, it introduces a "slow path" that applies the effects of software transactions using HTM, allowing "fast-path" transactions to use lazy subscription with respect to these transactions. Nonetheless, in order to avoid pitfalls such as those described in our paper, fast-path transactions must subscribe early to a global lock used to protect "slow-slow-path" transactions that cannot be committed using HTM; such transactions are executed in software, and thus may expose partial effects to hardware transactions that have not subscribed to the lock.
Compiler support suggested recently [3] for avoiding such issues in SGL-based transaction systems is not sufficient to ensure correctness. We argue that the complexity required to address these issues via static analysis is unlikely to be worthwhile. Precise analysis of when subscription can be deferred is complex and is likely to result in relatively early subscription in most cases; conservative analysis to mitigate such complexity will only exacerbate the problem, largely eliminating any benefit from lazy subscription.
Without detailed analysis of the compiled code for benchmarks used to evaluate the benefits of lazy subscription, it is difficult to assess how meaningful their results are. However, in our ongoing work, we are experimenting with lazy subscription in carefully controlled benchmarks for which we are confident lazy subscription does not compromise correctness. Our preliminary results convince us that lazy subscription is worth pursuing further, as it does yield significant performance benefits without compromising correctness in at least some cases. However, as we have argued, there are numerous pitfalls associated with lazy subscription, so manual confirmation of its safety in specific cases is likely to be error prone.
In this paper, we have also described hardware extensions that eliminate these issues entirely in hardware, allowing lazy subscription to be safely used with TLE and SGL-based transaction systems with no special compiler support or manual analysis. While we believe these changes are likely to add only modest cost and complexity to an HTM design, such extensions undoubtedly have a cost. Thus, it remains to be seen whether this cost will be justified by the benefits of enabling the use of lazy subscription.
